



History, Myth and Memory
"Scientific truth is not burdened with moral issues; it is
knowledge." p. 545
One of the most fundamental assumptions of modernism in
contrast to postmodernism is the presumed difference between
fact and fiction. Fictional representations are not to be
assessed by the same criteria of truth as historical ones.
There are many reasons which might suggest to some readers
that I am a postmodernist. For one, this book is concerned
with an exploration focusing on a representation of the
Holocaust rather than the Holocaust itself. Further, it is a
representation in two fictional formats - a novel and a film -
though they claim to represent the 'truth'. This seems to fit
in with the postmodernist tendency to take the minor leaves
(the saving of 1100 rather than the murder of six million) and
the representation of an important event rather than the event
itself as important issues to be explored. My analysis is, in
fact, a comparison of two artistic representations in two
different media of Schindler's rescue efforts in the Holocaust
in relationship to the victims and the perpetrators. Since I
seem more preoccupied with the representation of events -
Schindler's saving of the 1100 and the Holocaust - than the
evidence for either interpretation of the event, this
reinforces the suggestion that I have adopted a postmodernist
perspective. As shall become even clearer, I go further and
emphasize the contrast between the emplotment which the
respective author and director use to develop somewhat
different characters for Oskar Schindler and explanations for
his behaviour; this reinforces the view that I have bought
into the postmodernist mode of discourse in which the
narrative presentation is the critical issue and not
individual claims about facts.1 Modernists tend to regard
narrative as the neutral container for historical facts.
Postmodernists take the narrative construction itself to be
the central critical issue in examining competing accounts.
Postmodernist writing seems to identify fiction and
history, though perhaps using different methods, rather than
radically separating them and identifying history with
science. When the focus is on the narrative structure in
differentiating interpretations of the same historical event,
the suspicion is reinforced. And when the effort is directed
at what would appear to be the aestheticization of history,
then queries about truth and the relationship of the story to
reality would seem to be out of place. Since this book can be
considered to be an analysis of two pieces of work at the same
time as it cannibalizes the works of others (the extensive
footnotes on Holocaust literature, historiography and films)
to undertake the analysis, this might confirm for many that
this work is, indeed postmodernist.2
But in insisting that fictional representations of
history also have to be assessed by such measures as
distortion and misrepresentation of facts, I appear to be
applying modernist criteria. Evidence is crucial to that task.
By contrast, postmodernists argue that, "we can never test our
conclusions by comparing the elected text with 'the past'
itself. So narrative substances do not refer to the past, nor
is such reference required from the point of view of
historical debate."3 Postmodernists, while not denying that
individual statements in an historical account must be true,
claim that the crucial factor in historiography is the
narrative and not the truth or falsity of individual
statements. As Ankerspit summed up the postmodernist position:
"Saying true things about the past is easy--anybody can do
that--but saying the right things about the past is difficult.
That truly requires historical insight and originality."4 In
contrast, for modernists, the critical area in historiography
is the selection and arrangement of the facts. "The reason for
historians' carefulness in this selection-procedure is that
these statements, when considered together, determine 'the
picture' of part of the past they wish to present to their
readers and for historians this 'picture' is no less important
than the statements that make it up."5
I disagree fundamentally with the postmodernist position
that the primary and almost exclusive concern is with the
narrative. But I also have major differences with modernism as
well. There have been two trends in modernism.6 History, if it
is to deal with truth, has to deal with objective truth as a
description and explanation of what really happened in the
world. History is to be modelled directly on science; an
individual action is only explained when it is subsumed under
a general law. This is history designed to serve the present
and control the future. The other trend of modernism,
following Kant and subjective idealism, upholds the ideal of
history as understanding the goals, values, perceptions of
conditions, alternatives and expectations of the historical
agent and of past societies in general; it is history
dedicated to an authentic representation of the past by
getting inside the minds of those historical agents who were
the key actors in the past. We have to know Schindler's
history to know him and why he did what he did. Thus, all
human reality is historical, and the right way of
investigating Schindler's mind is by use of the historical
empathetic method. Historical understanding is knowing that
the action was the thing to have done for the reasons given.
History alone can assess what Oskar Schindler's motives were
for doing what he did. And historical methods are radicallly
different from scientific ones.
In both the scientific and idealist view of
historiography, fiction is something wholly other than
historical fact. Further, both stress thought to the exclusion
of affects, whether those thoughts are considered from the
inside as it were, or as objective data indicated by external
behaviour. There is also a tendency of both positivist and
empathetic historians to try to make history objective by
excluding any evaluation of why the agents did what they did.
It is one thing to get inside Schindler's mind and subsume his
beliefs under a general norm - 'If Schindler believed x, y,
and z, then the thing to do was x,' - or to subsume ordinary
rational behaviour under a generalization about human
behaviour - 'Agents of Schindler's type, under specific sets
of kinds of conditions, generally do x. But in neither case is
it the duty or responsibility of the historian to evaluate the
norms of the agent or the behavioural patterns under which his
or her actions could be included. For, in getting into the
minds of the perpetrators of an action - in some cases, an
unspeakable crime - or subsuming the action under a
behavioural norm considered 'rational' in some sense, in
understanding their motives, there is the appearance of
excusing them. For a key guideline of an empathetic historian
is to understand and not judge; a key guideline of a
positivist is to subsume under a general law and not judge.
This gives the appearance of removing any moral responsibility
from both the agents and the historians.
So I appear to be a postmodernist by concentrating on
fictional forms and taking a heightened interest in the
effects of the narrative structure on the interpretation. But
in assessing factual details in terms of the evidence for what
really occurred, I appear to be a modernist. But in insisting
that we evaluate the norms of both the narrator and the agents
in history, I appear to be pre-modern.
This book is confusing in other ways. Postmodernism tends
to celebrate the death of Whig history which glorified the
individual and concentrated on explaining an individual
historical agent's actions. This work celebrates the focus on
a few key individuals. With Oskar Schindler, the autonomous
individual has been resurrected for history. But, as Jason
Epstein complained, Spielberg failed to provide historical
perspective for either the Holocaust or Oskar Schindler.7
Instead of a loss of historicity and the past, this monograph
is concerned with its more comprehensive recovery. And instead
of allowing the story of Schindler to disintegrate simply into
emanations of our present projections, this monograph argues
that the various projections can be weighed, not simply
relative to one another in a series of unrelated presents, but
to the real past.
Assessing the truth claims of a movie and a novel (and
later the moral values of both the interpretors and the
historical agents) should seem very peculiar to both
postmodernists and modernists. Such an effort would seem
suspicious from a modernist perspective which separates fact
and fiction into two radically different fields; in modernist
thought, the distinction between historical fact and fiction
is unproblematic. A concern with the truth value of a
fictional account seems doubly suspicious when it runs counter
to a major focus on the aesthetic characteristics of the
representations of Schindler. The latter might lead one to
believe I am a postmodernist, and postmodernists aesthesticize
philosophy and history.8 The issue is not the truth value of a
construction, but the power each construction serves.
This raises the question of the relationship between the
"truth" about the Holocaust and OsKar Schindler and the
fictive narrative in which both are presented. For
postmodernists, fictive modes for exploring history are as
valuable as historiographical modes.
"(O)ne must face the fact that when it comes to
apprehending the historical record, there are no
grounds to be found in the historical record itself
for preferring one way of construing its meaning
over another."9
Is Hayden White correct that there are no reasons to
choose one narrative account over another, that Keneally's or
Spielberg's or an historians are of equal value? Then would
those who construct a narrative denying the Holocaust
altogether be equally valid? Would a story which said that the
gas chambers were a fiction, that the Jews were merely
deported to the East, that many of them died from disease and
execution for rebellion, but that there was no systematic
genocide, would such a narrative have equal merit? Is there
such a thing as a 'true' narrative versus false ones?
"Within this shattered realm of historical
discourse, how is one to situate the 'revisionist'
enterprise? Its perfidiousness lies precisely in its
seeming to be precisely what it is not, an attempt
to write and think through history. It is not a
matter of constructing a true narrative."10
If much of the current exciting debate in the theory of
history is between the postmodernists and the modernists, I am
afraid I am out of the current stream or swimming upstream
against the current. While avant garde historians are
proposing to replace modernist themes with postmodernist ones,
I have begun with postmodernist topics - such as an analysis
of a novel or a film - and want to subject them to modernist
criteria of truth and evidence while accepting that fiction
and fact are not necessarily separate enterprises. Fictional
forms which claim to portray 'truth' must be evaluated
according to the criteria of truth. But unlike the modernists,
affects are as important as the thoughts of historical agents.
Further, such actions must themselves be evaluated and not
simply subsumed under a normative or lawlike behavioural
generalization. And history must not presume a God's eye view,
whether a perspective from the scientists outside history
altogether, or from inside the mind of the historical agent.
Finally, history must not only be faithful to the actual past,
but must be written to penetrate the armor we wear in the
present and be memorable for the future. On these latter
counts, unlike the vast majority of 'histories', Keneally's
novel and Spielberg's movie are very superior forms of
historiography.
......
Spielberg claimed that in his movie he was creating a
document about the Holocaust though it was also a story of
rescue based on historical fact. In an interview in Newsweek,
he stated, "I never in my life told the truth in a movie. My
effort as a moviemaker has been to create something that
couldn't possibly happen. So people could leave their lives
and have an adventure and then come back to earth and drive
home. That was one of the things I thought: if I'm going to
tell the truth for the first time, it should be about this
subject."11
Spielberg wanted to tell a story about an actual world
rather than a possible world, though the tale he was telling -
a story of salvation from terror - was one he had told many
times before. What is the relationship of the heroic tale of
rescue and the portrait of the Holocaust to history?
Many have argued that the Holocaust cannot even be
represented; as a subject, it defies the minimal conventions
of dramatic narrative. Others claimed that the story of the
Holocaust cannot be told in realistic history; the Holocaust
is so extraordinary that it requires presentation in a
fictional mode. Others argue that the uniqueness of the
Holocaust is such that no narrative - fictional or historical
- can portray it. The Holocaust belongs to a grotesque science
fiction world rather than any order of reality with which we
are familiar? If this order of reality is so gross and
incomprehensible that any interpretation is equal in value as
far as truth is concerned (though not, perhaps, aesthetic
values), is a more authentic response silence rather than
something which will simply give the feeling of a novel
fabrication? Or do we take the opposite stand and say, as
Professor Zaicek does in Amos Oz's novel, Touch the Water,
Touch the Wind, "Surely there are moments in the life of an
individual or of a people when silence is an abhorrent misuse
of speech...In the face of evil, we must stand up and say:
evil!"12 Should the genuine response be a collaboration between
history and fiction to produce silence, since the "ineffable
lies beyond the frontiers of the word,"13 or should it be a
scream in the face of evil?
Do we speak or stay silent? If we speak, is the Holocaust
so incomprehensible that any speech must inherently distort
that to which it refers? Or is speech so inherently inadequate
that as soon as we construct a narrative which selects facts
about the subject matter, we impose our own set of values; the
result is not a portrayal of the Holocaust, but of our
Holocaust, with the result that the Holocaust comes across as
an arbitrary construction from which it is only one short
logical step to allowing equal time to any Holocaust denier?
That last step, which feeds Holocaust deniers, is not a
logical one, however. Hayden White, in suggesting there is no
reason to choose one narrative construction of meaning over
another is not claiming that reference to accuracy,
completeness and consistency are irrelevant. "Competing
narratives can be assessed, criticized, and ranked on the
basis of their fidelity to the factual record, their
comprehensiveness, and the coherence of whatever arguments
they may contain."14 Holocaust deniers flout these basic rules
of evidence. But both Spielberg and Keneally insist they are
following them.
However, are the minimal conventions of narrative,
whether historical or fictional, inadequate to deal with a
representation of the Holocaust? Why do some claim that the
Holocaust cannot be represented in a dramatic narrative?
The reasons have to do with the nature of the Holocaust
itself and the forms of dramatic narrative available to tell
the story. Though the Holocaust is about the mass murder of
six million Jews, it can only be represented in a dramatic
narrative if it is also about the nature of all humans and the
situation in which humanity finds itself. If the Holocaust is
so unique in being only about one people and is totally
without precedent in history, then its very exceptionality
means that it cannot be represented in a dramatic narrative.
For dramatic narrative structures use the particular to make
generalizations about the human predicament. 
Secondly, dramatic narratives, if told from the side of
the victors, are heroic or epic. The qualities of virtue
belong to the victorious side. Does anyone want to write the
tale of the destruction of European Jewry by the Nazis in
heroic or epic terms? If told from the side of the victims,
the story must be told as a romance or tragedy.15 The issue
becomes the flaws of the victims which they can overcome to
produce happy results, or which can overwhelm them and result
in tragedy. In the case of the Holocaust, though the Nazis
lost World War II, they won the war against the Jews. They
overwhelmed and virtually eliminated Jews from their prominent
place in Europe. In the short run at least, the forces of evil
were victorious with respect to the Jews in Europe. If the
story is to be told from the side of the Jews, it could never
be a romance. The interesting factors would be the flaws in
the Jewish character that helped bring about this disaster.
But no flaws, whatever they might be, are commensurate with
the result of six million dead. Genres of dramatic narrative
are not structured to tell a story of the defeat and virtual
elimination of a people from a part of this world by the
forces of evil.
There is a third reason that the Holocaust seems immune
to narrative. Not only does evil appear to win, but moral
choices, which are the sinews of a narrative, seem superfluous
in the context of the Holocaust. Moral choices were apparently
meaningless given the arbitrariness and systematic nature of
the extermination process.16 For many, it did not seem to be
possible to construct a narrative of the Holocaust based on a
conflict between good and evil in which the resolution,
through the choices and sequence of actions of the significant
historical agents, provide an important message for humanity.
(T)he dramatic narrative is composed of the
following essentials: a significant conflict whose
development and resolution induce a serious
reflection on and refine our perception of the human
predicament; the behaviour of the dramatic agents in
the framework of the basic conflict whose actions
involve crucial decisions that affect the progress
of the narrative and bear special moral weight; and
a complete action whose narrative units relate to
each other in a sequential manner, creating
expectations for probable and meaningful
developments whose fulfilment is achieved and
dominated by an overall coherence.17
The claim that the Holocaust cannot be represented, at
the very least in a dramatic narrative, is not based on the
claim that the facts of the Holocaust cannot be known and
shown, but that explanatory structures which relate to the
significance of moral choices seem inappropriate, and the
values central to the issue of the Holocaust cannot be
represented given the conventions of dramatic narrative. A
unique story may have no lessons for humanity; evil wins and
moral choices seem irrelevant to changing the course of that
victory.
Those who claim that the Holocaust cannot be represented
in dramatic narrative do not necessarily claim that it cannot
be represented in narrative at all. Historical narrative might
do.
Spielberg, like Keneally, claimed he wanted to tell the truth
about the Holocaust. Based on an historical figure and actual
events and persons saved, Spielberg wanted to tell the story
about a saviour in the midst of the Holocaust. In asserting
this, he was making a claim that the particular facts about
both the Holocaust and the story of Schindler's actions would
be factually acccurate. A dramatic narrative is historical if
the facts portrayed in it claim to represent the facts as they
actually occurred in history. A dramatic narrative is
fictional if the facts portrayed do not represent what
actually occurred. Spielberg was making a claim to be
historical in at least this minimal sense.
But if a narrative simply represents the facts as they
occurred, it cannot be dramatic. It cannot even be history; it
is only a chronology. As soon as you have agents in conflict,
values are at stake. The issue is not just about facts.
Secondly, there is a need for explanation, a need to
understand why one side wins and the other loses. That is why
some argue that the Holocaust is unrepresentable in a dramatic
narrative. They claim that the Holocaust is so unique and so
horrendous that it is inexplicable through any dramatic
narrative that attempts to explain what occurred.
We are now quite certain, however, about some
aspects of the death camps. We all agree that
commonsense explanations simply don't explain. None
of the ordinary hypotheses of lawlessness, lust, the
desire for personal gain, utility, or even simple
hatred are really plausible. Nazi motivations
largely defied normal expectations or predictions.18
The problem is not explaining the fact of mass murders.
After all, "There is nothing more common, nothing more sadly
banal in human history than massacres."19 The issue is
explaining the motivations for them in contrast to our
expectations of rational behaviour. Is the Holocaust
explicable? Can the motivations of the perpetrators be
explained? Both fictional and historical dramatic narratives
necessarily include an explanation, even if only to explain
why what happened is inexplicable.
History is scientific if the facts are established
through conventions accepted as scientific and if explanations
are offered in terms of normative and/or empirical
generalizations which can be verified or falsified by
reference to history, particularly the facts of history. If an
explanation is offered using the facts of history, but the
explanation is not itself falsifiable by those facts, then we
do not have scientific history, only history in the form of a
fictional narrative structure or an idée fixé, whether that
history is told in an historical form or in a fictional one.
Thus, if one believes that the Holocaust is inexplicable, or
if one offers an explanation which cannot itself be tested,
but uses the facts of history to relay the dramatic narrative,
then what we have is a fictional narrative utilizing
historical data to construct the fiction.
In assessing the truth value of the account offered in
Spielberg's version of Schindler's List, I am concerned with
both the issue of whether the facts are accurate and the issue
of whether the explanation offered is consistent with all the
facts available. Assuming that the Holocaust is not immune to
dramatic narrative, did Spielberg get the portrait right in
both its factual details and in its overall explanatory
account of what happened? Did he do the same for Oskar
Schindler? What is the relationship of the narrative story to
his intention of telling the truth about the Holocaust? What
is the connection between the narrative of the Holocaust to
actual history and to the dramatic narrative of rescue?
There is irony in the contrast between the two tales -
the one of mass murder and the story of the rescue. A con
artist, money grubbing, opportunistic Nazi (according to
Spielberg) can save 1300 Jews (1100 of them Schindler Jews),
more than all the good burghers of Germany put together. And
it is not just the Germans who failed so atrociously; all the
western states failed to help the Jews.20. The immobilism of
the virtuous West is one abhorrent truth of history confronted
by this exceptional story of salvation. This is, however, to
use truth in a different sense than reference to a particular
fact which is accurate. This is a general factual truth -
western countries failed to assist the Jews when they could
have helped. Further, it is a sense of truth which embodies
within it an evaluation - Western countries are condemned for
the failure to act. The books on this topic21 not only describe
that failure to act; the descriptive generalization entails a
condemnation.
Thus, scientific narrative history, whether in a
fictional or historical format, must deal with both true
particular facts and true empirical generalizations. Further,
when they include the latter, norms are, at the very least,
implicitly involved. Yet both the story of the Holocaust and
the tale of rescue seem to stand outside the norms of
descriptive and explanatory historiography in very different
ways. Both the Holocaust and the tale of rescue seem to be
exceptions to normal historical generalizations by which we
live and deal with experience. If the story of the Holocaust
is claimed to be so unique that it has no lessons for
humanity, the story of rescue seems to be a tale of a very
different type of exceptionalism. Spielberg, the master of
fabulism, was not just taking on an everyday problem of
historical narrative - the facts and explanation of the Gulf
War, or the facts and explanation for John F. Kennedy's
assassination. The Holocaust is central to the history of the
twentieth century and claimed by many to be unique in history.
The story of salvation from terror, on the other hand, is a
central myth in all cultures which provides an ironic
contrast, a counterfactual, which sets the Holocaust in
starker relief.
Myth is neither historical nor anti-historical: it
is counter-historical. Jesus is not presented as an
historical figure (in the Gospels), but as a figure
who drops into history from another dimension of
reality, and thereby shows what the limitations of
the historical perspective are.22
Myth in the above sense means a story which conveys a
basic truth - in this case about salvation - in contrast to a
general historical truth - the fact that so few individuals
and states acted to help save the Jews. However, since
Herodotus, historians have tended to use myth to mean a
fiction, a lie and not a story which tells a basic truth. This
is the way Pierre Vidal-Naquet, the famous French historian of
the classical world, uses myth when he battles against
Holocaust deniers. "I call 'revisionism' the doctrine
according to which the genocide practiced by Nazi Germany
against Jews and Gypsies did not exist but is to be regarded
as a myth, a fable, or a hoax."23
Myth thus means a story which tells a basic truth.24 It
also refers to a particular or general factual falsehood. Myth
also means false in a different, larger sense; it refers to an
historical explanatory thesis which is immune to any
falsification. A myth is a closed system. Thus, even
legitimate historians, such as Lucy Davidowicz, can be accused
of propagating myths. Vidal-Naquet claims her intentionalist
thesis about Nazi motives, namely, that the Nazis always
planned to exterminate the Jews, is a myth because it is
immune to falsification. In reference to Lucy Davidowicz's
intentionalist thesis in the War Against the Jews, Vidal-
Naquet writes, "The structure is not that of an historical
process, composed of advances and setbacks, of chance and
necessity; it is that of the self-enclosed structure of
myth."25
Thus, myth is used in at least three senses. In one
sense, it refers to stories that tell basic truths about
humans. In a second meaning, myths are claims about events or
actions, or denials about events or actions, that are patently
false. In a third sense, myths are ahistorical explanatory
frameworks which are: a) immune to falsification, and b)
immune to historical forces.
There is a fourth sense of myth. In addition to myths
being stories that convey basic truths or tell particular
falsehoods or
which convey a message immune to falsification, myth is used
in the sense of conveying a moral message to guide future
action. The Holocaust can itself be used for mythical purposes
in this sense, as in Emil Fackenheim's insistence that the
Holocaust commands Jews to survive as a people lest Hitler be
given a posthumous victory. With respect to the latter, Yosef
Yerushalmi stated, "it is hard to escape the feeling that the
Jewish people after the Holocaust stands today at a juncture
not without analogy to that of the generations following the
cataclysm of the Spanish Expulsion. They...ultimately chose
myth over history." Further, he continued, "Myth and memory
condition action. There are myths that are life-sustaining and
deserve to be reinterpreted for our age. There are some that
lead astray and must be redefined. Others are dangerous and
must be exposed."26 Thus, myth, in the sense of tales that
remain memorable as stories to instruct us about future
behaviour, can be creative and useful or destructive and
dysfunctional.
There are then four senses of myth: myth as rendering a
basic truth; myth as a particular falsehood opposed to a fact;
myth as an ahistorical explanatory framework for history
immune to falsification and historical forces; myth as a use
of history as a foundation on which to base current and future
behaviour. The second, third and fourth senses are mythical
constructions - one of facts, one of the development of the
Holocaust, and the third of its meaning for the future. Only
the second and the third are opposed to truth. The fourth, as
a constructions of the whole for future use, is not itself
measurable in terms of truth. The second and third senses use
myth in relation to truth - one in the sense of not telling
factual truths and the other in the sense of offering
explanations which are not supportedby facts or are immune to
being falsified by the facts of history. Though myth in the
first sense is related to truth, it appears to be unlike
senses two and three where the criteria for assessing truth
are used to judge the narrative as false in relation to the
truth. Myth and truth are congruent when the myth communicates
what is considered to be a basic truth accepted by a culture
even when the narrative is not true in senses two and three,
and even when it does not effect responsible action and even
may counteract it.
Like myth, therefore, the concept of truth is also
equivocal. In one meaning, when myth is said to capture a
basic truth, truth is an insight into essntial norms accepted
by a society to guide behaviour. Stories of salvation told in
all cultures are intended to relay truths accepted as basic.
More often in our scientific age, truth refers to the second
sense, the verity of particulars or empirical generalizations.
Did this happen or not? Were there or were there not gas
chambers used by Nazis to exterminate the Jews? This meaning
of truth contrasts with myth in sense 2 above. Truth and myth
are mutually exclusive opposites. In the relationship of truth
to particulars, the famous nineteenth century German
historian, Otto Ranke, offered a formulation of the
relationship of truth and falsehood, would seem to be
appropriate. Truth is the opposite of falsehood and is
independent of the synthetic interpretation offered in the
narrative connection of those particulars. In the German
historiographical tradition of the Enlightenment, "the
disciples of Clio could reach agreement only when uncovering
facts. The moment they imparted meaning to these facts, the
same disputes arose which had existed prior to the development
of the improved methods."27 Facts could be agreed upon;
descriptions were either true or false. Interpretations were
subject to disagreement. This led some past historians of the
seventeenth century and subsequently to believe that, unlike
science, "History, at its best, could offer only correspondent
truth."28 Thus, in the seventeenth century, Christian Wolff29
would designate history as the science of particulars, the
'bare knowledge of fact'.
Facts include empirical generalizations. Historical
empirical generalizations are made in historiography as they
are in general life. To say that the western nations did not
help the Jews during the 1933-45 period to survive the
Holocaust does not mean that there were no examples where
states acted positively - the actions of the King of Denmark
and of the citizens of Denmark are examples that indicate that
at least one state did. Nor does it mean that the other
nations never did anything to help a single Jew. It just means
that, given their capacities and the need, generally most of
the states in the West did not offer much help to saving the
Jews from the Nazi murder-machine. Exceptions are granted even
though the generalization is said to be true. However, if many
states behaved as Denmark did, or if many states helped a
large number of Jews instead of only a few, then the
generalization would be regarded as false.
But truth is also used in relationship to the synthetic
account as a whole and not just the many particulars that make
it up or generalizations based on those particulars. I adopt
the following guide concerning synthetic wholes. They are
lies, and not just mythological narratives, if the key
particulars on which they are based are false or if the
generalizations at which they arrive are immune to
falsification by particular pieces of evidence. "It is the
distinguishing characteristic of a lie to want to pass itself
off as truth."30
We thus have empirical truths of fact, both particular
and general, which are contrasted with myths which are based
on that which is not factual. Secondly, we have explanations
which are said to be true if they are based on historical
facts and if they account for what happened without remaining
immune to falsification by what happened: those that remain
immune are considered explanatory myths. Thirdly, the facts
and explanations are welded into narrative wholes which convey
"a truth" which can be used to guide action, and which is a
lie only if it is based on false facts or ill-considered
explanations. Such narratives are intended to become myths.
Fourth, there is the sense of truth as a basic insight into
human nature held by the society. Our most important cultural
narratives are myths intended to convey such basic truths. In
that sense, myths and truths are not opposite, but convergent.
Holocaust deniers are liars because they construct a
parody of history based on particulars which are outright lies
and falsifications. And they do so because they do not follow
the conventions for establishing the truth or falsity of a
particular, but follow a method which determines the results
in advance. Holocaust deniers are the spiritualists of the
twentieth century; they choose incomprehensibility as a
superior value over the consistency of reason. In their
Manichaean world, those reborn with this sight into the anti-
world, the shadow world, are reborn witnesses to the revealed
truth irrespective of the amount of empirical evidence. They
bring forth phantasms that never existed, and cast into a
netherworld existential facts. They constitute a sect whose
only unity is their opposition to empirical rationality. For
the source of truth is the inner vision within each of them.
There can be no institutionalized framework of value and truth
norms. It is as possessors of an inner light, immune to
negative evidence, that they have become, like other sects, a
new church militant. They believe that the real witnesses to
the truth are in the ranks of heretics denying the Holocaust
simply because what they pronounced is a heresy. Being
heretical made it true.
There is a second kind of Holocaust denier of a very
different order. They do not deny the facts of history; they
minimalize their significance. The error is not made primarily
in falsifying facts but in offering explanations which are
selective in the use of facts and, in extreme cases, are
absurd; in all cases, they remain immune to falsification by
evidence. Ernst Nolte31, a former student of Heidegger32, is a
German historian who attributes the Nazi genocide to a
protective and mirrored response to "the more original Asiatic
deed", to which the Nazi innovation was only the technology of
gassing (which was Keneally's thesis). This is a thesis not
only of moral minimalization, but one which remains immune to
falsification by facts. The thesis depends on a very careful
selection of facts, both in what is excluded and in what is
included.
There is not only distortion that results from falsifying
facts and exclusion, and from drawing generalizations that can
neither be supported by the facts and/or are immune to
falsification by them. Distortion can result from placing the
Holocaust in an inappropriate context. Historical narratives
are also constructed using this type of deformation. Andreas
Hillgruber33, for example, while clearly placing the blame for
the genocide of the Jews on Nazi racist policies and the
complicity of the Wehrmacht, as well as the army's ideology of
lebensraum, parallels two tragedies, the genocide of the Jews
in the East and  the ethnic cleansing of the eleven million
Germans from the East after the war and their forced
relocation back to the heartland of Germany, during which
process an estimated two million Germans died. Hillgruber, in
drawing a parallel between the two disasters, has been accused
of trivializing history by inadvertently and indirectly
reducing the significance and historical import and uniqueness
of the Holocaust. Like Fackenheim, the issue here is not the
representation of history, but the use of that history for
evaluation and guiding human action. Hillgruber, like Nolte,
engages in moral minimalization, but not by the selective use
of facts to create explanations immune to falsification, but
by creating a synthetic whole intended to teach one lesson
rather than another.
Hillgruber validates the choice of the Wehrmacht to fight
on even after Army Group Centre, the strongest German army
facing the Russians, was overwhelmed with a loss of 350,000
casualties in June of 1944, because they wanted to diminish
the revenge that would be visited on the German populations of
the East by the Soviet troops as well as sow the seeds of
discord rather than responsibility. This justification for the
army's continuation in the war on the basis of reasons of
state also meant that the mass slaughter of the Jews would
continue for another year, including the murder of Hungarian
Jewry, not to mention the death of up to two million
additional German military and civilian casualties.
Hillgruber's main historical message is to lament the loss of
Germany's traditional role as the linchpin of central Europe,
mediating between East and West instead of becoming a satrap
divided in loyalties between the American and Soviet empires
(Hillgruber died in 1989.), but without discussing the key
role of the German Jews in this process of mediation. Charles
Maier dubbed this the "politics of nostalgia." German
character and identity did not depend on race or on culture,
what Hume called the inner element of historical life and
Collingwood called the thought side. German character was
related to territory, "the land of the middle."34
......
In assessing whether Spielberg lived up to his claim to
tell a true story, I will be concerned with all four senses of
truth applied to dramatic narrative. The Holocaust must be
accurately represented; the account must satisfy a
correspondence theory of truth. Secondly, the account must
offer an explanation which is consistent with all the facts
available and not just a selection of them; the account should
be comprehensive with regard to the facts, Thirdly, the
account must not only be accurate and comprehensive in both
the particular facts cited and the explanations drawn based on
those facts, but the context in which the story is told must
also be assessed. Is the story placed in an appropriate
context so that we come to understand the historical
significance of the Holocaust? That is, what coherence does
Spielberg offer to both the Holocaust itself and the tale of
rescue told in the context of the Holocaust? "To understand
Shoah is not to know the Holocaust, but to gain new insights
into what not knowing means, to grasp the ways in which
erasure is itself part of the functioning of our history. The
journey of Shoah thus paves the way toward new possibilities
of understanding history, and toward new pragmatic acts of
historicizing history's erasures."35
Shoshana Felman is here speaking about Claude Lanzmann's
representation of the Holocaust in the documentary film,
Shoah. There is a scene in the film in front of a Polish
church where Srebnik, the only survivor of this town, stands
amongst a Polish crowd of older people who are recounting
their memories of the Holocaust. Srebnik is silent throughout
this long section of the film, though his facial expressions
and body language convey the impression of increasing
embarrassment, though familiarity rather than surprise, at the
"myths" of his former countrymen with which he was undoubtedly
familiar. One older fellow interrupts to claim he knows why
all the Jews were killed and why there was no protest, even
from the Jews he said. A direct witness had told him that he
had listened as a rabbi told all his congregants that they
should do what the Nazis told them because they carried the
blood of Jesus on their backs.  
"The film's strategy is not to challenge the false
witness, but to make the silence speak from within
and from around the false witness: the silence
within each of the testimonies; the silence between
various silences and various testimonies; the
irremedial silence of the dead; the irremedial
silence of the natural landscapes; the silence of
the church procession; the silence of the ready-made
cultural discourses pretending to account for the
Holocaust; and above all, in the center of the film,
Srebnik's silence in front of the church, in the
middle of the talkative, delirious, self-complacent
Polish crowd."36
"(T)he Polish villagers are not aware that they
themselves are in turn acting out precisely such a ritual
murder story, actually enacting both the Crucifixion and the
Holocaust in annihilating Srebnik, in killing once again the
witness whom they totally dispose of, and forget."37 As Claude
Lanzmann himself said, "When one deals with the destruction of
the Jews, one has to talk and be silent at one and the same
moment...I think there is more silence in Shoah than words."38
In Spielberg's version of the Holocaust, there are few such
silences, though Helen Hirsch's profound silence in the face
of Amon as he circles her threateningly and accuses her of
trying to talk him into seducing her, could be cited. But it
is the silence of reproach rather than of a witness. What
witness to history does Schindler's List perform?
Finally, Schindler's List may be mythological in
conveying a basic truth accepted by the society in which and
for which it is primarily produced. This is one way in which
narrative communicates. It appeals to existing beliefs. Truth
and myth are also complementary when a narrative structure is
so powerful that it reaches the level of myth to penetrate the
blinkers on our current vision. Almost all of us are like
handicapped children who have been desensitized and
handicapped so that we are unable to see any more, not because
we have become deaf or blind, but because we have been so
overstimulated by sensory overload that our vision is as
stunted and distorted as if we were autistic children. The
average TV viewer sees a thousand murdered humans a week,
three hundred and sixty thousand a year. Further, a flood of
fictional images have preceded any encounter with actuality
however reality has been represented. One requirement of a
historical representation is that it be penetrating. It must
reach our hearts and touch us. On this level of evaluation,
there are two issues. One is readily answered - does the movie
have a powerful emotional impact? It undoubtedly does.
Secondly, what emotions does it touch to reach our
sensibilities? Does it permeate sensibilities which are
considered primary in that society and by means of myths
accepted as basic truths by that society? Or does the
narrative challenge different sensibilities by creating a myth
which undermines what are considered to be basic truths.
The four meanings of myth and four meanings of truth are
related. They correspond to four uses of narrative to which
the different senses of myth and truth are connected. We thus
have four different levels for assessing the historical
validity of the movie. As antiquarian history, is it true to
the facts of both the Holocaust story and the story of
Schindler's rescue? Myths are created based on false facts and
false empirical generalizations. Facts which correspond to
reality and on which generalizations are formed yield
authentic historical or even fictional narratives which are
authentically historical in this sense. In measuring the
factual truth, I do not hold the view that the criteria of
truth are simply relative to the culture from which a concept
emerges or the framework and methodological assumptions of the
inquiry being employed.39 On the other hand, I do not hold they
are ahistorical as Moltke Gram suggests.40 The criteria for
assessing the facts of history are themselves debatable in
history, provided the positions are responsible and responsive
to criticisms offered by other positions and to the 'data'
available. This is not the case for the deniers of the
Holocaust.
Secondly, as explanatory history which takes into account
the behavioural norms and expectations of the reader or
viewer, does the narrative pander to explanatory
generalizations which are themselves immune to falsification
by history, and, if so, is this done by selecting the facts
used so that the account offered is inconsistent with the
facts available? If the narrative does this, then we have
historical myth in a second sense.
Myths are also narratives which use the stories of the
past as guides to future action. The representation of the
Holocaust must be memorable as well as antiquarian in
conforming to the facts of the past and scientific in offering
a convincing explanation which is both consistent with all the
facts and not immune to falsification by them. "I am equally
convinced that a historiography that does not aspire to be
memorable is in peril of becoming a rampant growth."41 To be
memorable, the narrative must penetrate our desensitized
hearts and consciousness if it is to serves the future.
The truth of the film must not only be assessed on
whether it penetrates our insensitivities, but what it make us
feel when we are emotionally involved. The suffering felt by
the victims may be as important as their terror. "Nor does the
film give us any sense of the level of suffering people
experienced in the concentration camps quite apart from their
actual extermination. Jews often starved to death."42 The film
may not be truthful in representing what emotionally happened
in a representative way. The Holocaust must not only be
recorded; the story must not only be told, but it must be done
in a way that it can be used by humans in the future to
revisit the Holocaust. As the survivors of the Holocaust die,
we will no longer have the stories of those who experienced
the event first hand. We have to be taught, informed or shown
what the Holocaust was. By keeping alive the story, we keep
the memories of the ghosts of those who died alive, and
through that identification, keep ourselves alive as well
through identification with death, so that both they and we
will not be beasts going into the present "like a number,
without leaving any curious remainder."43 Narrative in this
context is intended to provide lessons about the future.
The dilemma is that which is most memorable is most
likely to monopolize the future image of the past. This is
particularly true where people know little history in general
and even less about the Holocaust. "(I)n a land without
history, whoever fills memory, coins the concepts and
interprets the past, wins the future."44 But a representation
which is memorable and serves the future by penetrating our
desensitized souls is not necessarily a representation which
is truthful in the way it portrays the past or in conveying an
explanation which conforms to the norms of what counts as an
adequate explanation in the present. Yet it is precisely a
representation that is penetrating and memorable that has the
greatest responsibility towards that past. Since "many more
are likely to view his (Spielberg's) new movie than read
Keneally's book, it bears an even heavier burden of veracity
and engagement."45
An adequate representation of the Holocaust and the story
of rescue must be faithful to at least two types of history:
antiquarian and scientific in the explanations on which the
narrative is based. The film has a responsibility to be
faithful to the past as it actually occurred. It must not bear
false witness.
The essence of Nazism was the erasure of Jewish history. The
Nazis burned even the buried bodies so there would be no
witnesses to the Holocaust, so that even the mass graves of
the dead would not be available to give witness.46 Giving
inadequate or false witness to the past is a betrayal of those
who were made victims of Hitler's attempt to erase history. As
antiquarian history, the representation of the Holocaust must
be truthful in conveying particular facts and empirical
generalizations. As scientific history, the narrative offers
an explanation which takes into account all the facts and is
not immune to being falsified.
False witnesses are a noisy lot. The thoroughness with
which the SS shot all those who tried to escape the clearing
of the ghetto, killing 4,500 Jews who tried to evade the
relocation to Plaszów in that one night alone, clarifies why
there are so few witnesses. Spielberg offers us the witnesses
who did survive. Does Spielberg distort that witnessing? Does
he attempt to explain the silence and inaction of others at
the time, the role of false witnessing in the past that
continues into the present that make current and future
Holocausts possible?
I take it as a given that Spielberg has created a
narrative through which the Holocaust has been made memorable.
The issue about the memorable aspect of the film is what we
are told to remember. The representation is effective if the
history is monumental in reaching us. But even in this case,
the way it penetrates must be measured. The narrative must be
directed towards the future by feeding our struggle to remain
responsible for our actions so that we assume the duty to act
against the heinous acts of others to achieve salvation and
deliverance. The narrative must be passionate in enabling us
to penetrate our resistance to understanding suffering in
being directed towards the preservation of the past and one of
the black holes of human history. "History is necessary to the
living man in three ways: in relation to his action and
struggle, his conservatism and his reverence, his suffering
and his desire for deliverance."47
What is the lesson taught by the film? Does it onvite the
viewer to act in the future to prevent such genocides? What
lesson does it teach about future action? To be 'truly'
memorable in a basic way, a representation of the past should
serve our need to have memories which will guide our future
actions. The film must cut through our desensitized souls and
encourage us to be active, responsible agents in history.
There is need for monumental history that enables future
generations not only to recall what happened, but to
understand why it happened, and use it as a guide for the
future. in doing so, what basic truth does the film
communicate if it aspires to be a myth that is true?
The issue of the truth value of a narrative is critical
for assessing the story in antiquarian and scientific terms.
But to assess a narrative as memorable and monumental - that
is, as an account which provides us with myths for the future
and which penetrates our desensitized souls to either question
or, if valuable in assisting us to become responsible human
agents in history, to reinforce our basic truths - then we
must finally deal with the issue of memory itself, the
subjective experience in dealing with 'truths' of history.
For the Greeks, memory was a technique, a craft, to
awaken the truth that was already within us or to recall the
image of a past occurrence so that we are better able to
discern in the present what truly is and to predict in the
future what will be. In contrast, for other Middle Easterners
including the Hebrews, memory was a testament. It had nothing
to do with prediction. It had nothing to do with separating
out appearances from the underlying reality. Memory at its
most basic was a written and recorded chronicle of the past so
that it could be available as a record for the future to
discern who deserved to be rewarded and who deserved to be
punished. Thus, King Ahaseurus wrote in the book of
Chronicles, during the Israeli captivity in Babylon, that
Mordechai had informed the king of the treachery of Bigthan
and Toresh, the King's gatekeepers, who were hung for their
treason.48 Later, in reading the Chronicles, he inquired
whether Mordechai had received an appropriate honour.49 Memory
as a written testament was in service of moral reward and
punishment.
For the Greeks, memory as a mental skill was itself a
moral virtue. For the Roman but Platonic Cicero, virtue has
four parts - prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. One
of the three key components of the virtue prudence is memory.
The other two are intelligence and foresight. Prudence is
knowledge of what is good, bad, or neither. "Memory is the
faculty by which the mind recalls what has happened.
Intelligence is the faculty by which it ascertains what is.
Foresight is the faculty by which it is seen that something is
going to occur before it occurs."50 Thus, for the Greeks,
memory was a faculty of the mind, and the art of memory "like
an inner writing,"51 rather than an externally written record.
Recollection or reminiscencing are not memory for the Greeks,
for the point of memory was to bring into the mind either
things or words to be used in the present rather than simply a
record of the past.
This difference is important because it permeates the
current debate about historiography and its relationship to
fictional creations, on the one hand, and moral judgement on
the other. More specifically, it is critical to understanding
the relationship between the cinematic and fictional versions
of the Schindler story and history itself. For Aristotle52,
memory is a part of the soul, a collection of mental images of
sense impressions taken from the past. Further, it belongs to
the same part of the soul as the imagination. Augustine
followed this Greek pattern of thought and, thereby,
influenced the whole attitude of the Catholic church to memory
and history. "Augustine conferred on memory the supreme honour
of being one of the three powers of the soul, Memory,
Understanding and Will, which are the image of the Trinity in
man."53 Memory is associated with affects and the imagination
(The Holy Ghost) in mediating between thought (God the father)
and action (Jesus as the Son of God). Thus, the art of memory
and the creative arts belong to the same part of the soul.
Using memory, imagination serves as the intermediary between
perception and thought, between thought and the will and
between the will and action. The soul requires a mental
picture in order to both think and act.
A very brief description of how the memory skills were
taught will provide a more concrete grasp of the differences
between this Hellenic/Christian version of memory and the
Hebraic conception. Essentially it worked by constructing a
spatial realm in one's mind, usually an architectural
construction consisting of a series of enclosed places -
living room, bedrooms, kitchen, courtyard, etc. The more
unique and more imaginative - either grotesque or unusual - in
which each space was configured, the more powerful the ability
of that spatial organization to serve as the backdrop to the
memory images which were to be recalled by first impressing
each of them on the different basic spaces. Further, the order
of the places was intended to preserve the order of things in
our memory. This was not the order in which they occurred,
although they could be, as when a professor wants to impress
his students on the power of his memory by immediately
recalling the names of his fifty students in the same order in
which they introduced themselves in the initial class. In this
memory system, there were two architectural constructions, one
for words and one for things. Each of the spatial rooms and
the designs in them were used as signs of what we want to
recall.
This system of memory can be contrasted with memory
systems common to nomads54 and the Hebrews before record
keeping was invented. In the Hellenic system, images were
impressed on an internal mental artificial construct or
theatre set. In Hebraic thought, the events in time were
imprinted on features of the natural landscape. In the Greek
system, an architectural artifact was used as a constant
backdrop on which to impress the images which we may wish to
recall. In nomadic and Hebraic memory, specific places in the
natural landscape were used both to record memorable past
events with a small monument and as a geographical mapping
device so that one could orient oneself in one's travels.
Greek memory was a mnemonic device for thought and performance
rather than travelling through space and time. Hebraic memory
was externalized and allowed travel into the past.
Why this is critical to issues of truth in history and in
fictional representations of that history is that the Greek
system of memory had two horrible results, quite aside from
its excellence as a mnemonic trick. One error was associated
with the architecture that was used as the backdrop on which
the images were to be impressed. The second was related to the
conception of images as an impression on the mind as if the
mind were a wax tablet.
The first error led to a long line of thinkers55, and
particularly totalitarian dictators, into a belief in the
magic of memory, into the use of memory as an occult device
for mind control, and into the construction of a mental
architecture as if it were itself a mirror of the cosmic
order. For they began to believe that there existed in actual
reality a correspondence that could be established between the
external world and the order of images in our minds. Ordering
those images properly could provide the secrets to the
universe. This was the occult version of the correspondence
theory of truth. Its most grotesque excesses were not only
astrology, which can be an innocent enough recreation if not
taken seriously, but the pseudo sciences of phrenology and
physiognomy, and the links between character traits and the
size of one's chin, the hook in one's nose, the shape of one's
ears, and even the bumps on one's skull as reflections of the
actual construction of space in the brain itself, reflecting
in turn a cosmic deviance from the natural order of the
universe.
There is a less heinous but nevertheless dangerous aspect
of this occult version of a memory system. As long as the
architectonic of the memory system was just a signal device to
facilitate recall of the particulars stored therein, there is
no problem. If the architectonic is suddenly taken, not simply
to be an artifact, but itself as a representation of reality,
there is a terrible danger. Leibniz, for example, not only was
a rationalist who believed in a universal mathematical norm as
the foundation for all human knowledge, but viewed the
universe, the cosmos, as reflecting in each of its units this
architectonic order. The dilemma is that such a belief easily
leads to the creation of self-enclosed circular arguments and
transcendental assumptions immune to empirical falsification.
Between the use of this architectonic memory device as a
heuristic tool and the belief in it as a reflection of a
cosmic order, there is a third, and possibly the most
prevalent version. The framework or architectonic for the
memory influences what can and what cannot be stored there. It
itself acts as a selection system.
If the occult version of the correspondence theory of
truth based on this fictive construction of how memory worked
and its role in the soul led to catastrophic consequences in
reality and to distortions in creating imaginative
reconstructions, the scientific version was intellectually as
disastrous. It was equally magical, based on "a theory on
which certain mental representations necessarily refer to
certain external things and kinds of things."56
The scientific version of the correspondence theory of
truth held that facts, more precisely, propositions about
facts, were descriptions based on initial impressions made on
the mind by sense impressions. "(M)ental representations no
more have a necessary connection with what they represent than
physical representations do. The contrary supposition is a
survival of magical thinking."57 But according to this magical
way of thinking, historical facts were recollections of these
original impressions. If history was to be truthful, it had to
replicate these original impressions. The way this debate
permeated the post Second World War philosophical debates in
the English-speaking world was in the form of a debate between
the two modernist philosophical interpretations of history
discussed earlier in this chapter.
In one version, the positivist or realist one, the truth
of facts were checked by comparing the description to the
external data that gave rise to those impressions. In the
other version, the idealist one, one checked the 'facts' by
envisioning a situation as an agent in that time and place
would have beheld it. For history was concerned with actions
and not just events, with the reasons that gave rise to
initiatives and not just the automatic responses of humans to
forces impacting on them. Thus, history required that we enter
the mind of the individual agent to perceive how that agent
perceived the world. "(A)n action is the unity of the outside
and the inside of an event," and by the inside of an event is
meant "that in it which can only be described in terms of
thought."58
I have made these two versions equivalent59, two sides of
the same coin of what Hilary Putnam called the God's eye view.
From  the positivists or realist perspective, it meant the
ability to rise above time and space, to stand outside of
history sub specie aeternitatis. >From the idealist point of
view, it meant the ability to get inside the mental space of a
past actor in history, what I referred to as sub specie
internitatis. Both versions were ahistorical in postulating a
method of undertaking history that presumed a magical
ahistorical act.
But the fact is that facts are not impressions on the
mind. They are established by societies according to
conventions. There must be agreement about some basic rules
for establishing truth, for evaluating the worth of documents
and the testimony of witnesses. "A dialogue between two
parties, even if they are adversaries, presupposes a common
ground, a common respect--in this case for truth."60  Witnesses
are a critical part of these conventions when it comes to
observational facts. This is not just a matter that our
original impressions can be distorted. Rational procedures
establish what a fact is and "our notions of rationality and
of rational revisability are not fixed by some immutable book
of rules, nor are they written into our transcendental
natures, as Kant thought."61 Those rational procedures are
social conventions of truth that emerge and are refined over
time. There are no ahistorical conventions to determine the
truth.
This means that memory has a far greater kinship with
nomadic conceptions than the the Western tradition going back
to the Greek philosophers. Further, it is consistent with the
results of current cognitive science. General concepts, for
example, are not the result of particular sensory inputs being
matched with already given categories in the brain, nor the
derivation through induction from particulars of those general
categories, but from what Gerald Edelman called brain maps.62
Sense impressions are not impressions at all, as if a form
were impressed on a wax tablet. Rather, the brain
hypothetically consists of sheeets of neurons which 'map'
corresponding points in our sensory receptors - the retina of
the eye for example - and other neuron sheets in other parts
of the brain, the latter enabling many parallel sensory paths
to operate at the same time. Further, these neuron clusters
are not tablets, but organic cells which live or die as they
are needed to adapt to deal with the environment with which
the human is faced as he or she develops. The brain changes
its configuration in response to the environment. As a result
of these combined factors, global maps are created which
permit not only categories and generalizations to be
developed, but nodal cognitive points which coordinate what we
see and how we act. Memory is not just receptive but critical
to what we see and how we behave, a dynamic process constantly
capable of reformulation depending on what we experience.
Images are critical to both thought and beaviour. Memory is
not a passive storage file in a cabinet or a computer, but an
active process of recategorizing and reformulating descriptive
and normative generalizations. To do this, the brain selects
what it sees in order to learn and adapt. That means that
'basic truths' are the prime means which determine what
sensory inputs we permit to stimulate the brain. These, in
turn, can be reinforced or undermined if the brain has
difficulty finding inputs which conform to basic convictions
and, in fact, encounters inputs which challenge those
convictions.
That is why history as a myth-making device to guide
future action and as a myth which either reinforces or
undermines 'basic truths' is so critical. History is not just
a neutral representation to be stored in our brains to use or
not to use as we see fit. It is the basis upon which we act
and even the basis upon which we select what we see in order
to determine what to do.
If Spielberg's film is more important than
historiographical accounts in creating myths for guiding
future behaviour and for either reinforcing or undermining the
basic way in which we even perceive the world, then it is
critical that we understand the 'facts' which the image has
selected to reinforce, the explanatory generalizations which
account for human behaviour implicit or explicit in the film,
and the effect of the film on the mythos which will govern
future behaviour and the mythos which will be reinforced or
undermined by the powerful images of the movie.
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